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Published Articles >> Table of Contents >> Abstract
19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'06)
pp. 28-42
Coercion-Resistance and Receipt-Freeness in Electronic Voting
Stephanie Delaune, LSV, France Telecom R&D, France
Steve Kremer, LSV, INRIA, France
Mark Ryan, University of Birmingham, UK
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DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/CSFW.2006.8
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| Abstract |
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In this paper we formally study important properties of
electronic voting protocols. In particular we are interested
in coercion-resistance and receipt-freeness. Intuitively, an
election protocol is coercion-resistant if a voter A cannot
prove to a potential coercer C that she voted in a particular
way. We assume that A cooperates with C in an interactive
fashion. Receipt-freeness is a weaker property, for which
we assume that A and C cannot interact during the protocol:
to break receipt-freeness, A later provides evidence
(the receipt) of how she voted. While receipt-freeness can
be expressed using observational equivalence from the applied
pi calculus, we need to introduce a new relation to
capture coercion-resistance. Our formalization of coercionresistance
and receipt-freeness are quite different. Nevertheless,
we show in accordance with intuition that coercionresistance
implies receipt-freeness, which implies privacy,
the basic anonymity property of voting protocols, as defined
in previous work. Finally we illustrate the definitions on a
simplified version of the Lee et al. voting protocol.
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 Additional Information
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Citation:
Stephanie Delaune, Steve Kremer, Mark Ryan,
"Coercion-Resistance and Receipt-Freeness in Electronic Voting,"
csfw,
pp. 28-42,
19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'06),
2006
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