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Published Articles >> Table of Contents >> Abstract
Ninth IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications 2004 Volume 2 (ISCC"04)
pp. 736-741
Oblivious router policies and Nash equilibrium
J.A. Almendral, Grupo de Dinamica No Lineal y Teoria del Caos, Univ. Rey Juan Carlos, Madrid, Spain
L.L. Fernandez, Sch. of Comput., Queen's Univ., Kingston, Ont., Canada
V. Cholvi, Telecommun. Program, Asian Inst. of Technol., Thailand
M.A.F. Sanjuan, Telecommun. Program, Asian Inst. of Technol., Thailand
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DOI Bookmark: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/ISCC.2004.1358628
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| Abstract |
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Most of congestion control schemes require users to behave in a cooperative way, so that they respect some "social responsible" rules. However, without forcing end users to adopt a centralized mandated algorithm controlling their behavior (which is not advisable), it is not possible to guarantee that they will not act in a selfish manner. Consequently, a fundamental issue is to evaluate the impact of having users that act in such a manner. In such a scenario, having a Nash equilibrium guarantees that no selfish user has incentive to unilaterally deviate from its current state (i.e., it guarantees that we are in a stable state in the presence of selfish users). However, here we formally prove that an efficient Nash equilibrium can not be reached in practice for any oblivious control policy.
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Citation:
J.A. Almendral, L.L. Fernandez, V. Cholvi, M.A.F. Sanjuan,
"Oblivious router policies and Nash equilibrium,"
iscc,
pp. 736-741,
Ninth IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications 2004 Volume 2 (ISCC"04),
2004
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