| Abstract |
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We present a non-malleable commitment scheme that retains its security properties even when concurrently executed a polynomial number of times. That is, a manin- the-middle adversary who is simultaneously participating in multiple concurrent commitment phases of our scheme, both as a sender and as a receiver, cannot make the values he commits to depend on the values he receives commitments to. Our result is achieved without assuming an a-priori bound on the number of executions and without relying on any set-up assumptions. Our construction relies on the existence of standard collision resistant hash functions and only requires a constant number of communication rounds.
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 Additional Information
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Citation:
Rafael Pass, Alon Rosen,
"Concurrent Non-Malleable Commitments,"
focs,
pp. 563-572,
46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'05),
2005
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